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 Foreign Affairs and Party Ideology in 
America: The Case of Democrats and 
World War II 
 While running for president in 1968, George Wallace frequently said that 
“there ain’t a dime’s worth of diB erence between the two parties.” E e Ameri-
can party system, he suggested, was rigged to present voters with two versions 
of the same thing; voters simply were not oB ered real alternatives. E ough it 
seems doubtful that Wallace surveyed the literature before opining, his argu-
ment was J rmly rooted in a vast and time-tested scholarship. It has oL en 
been said that ideological diB erences—at least any of a serious or fundamen-
tal nature—are lacking in the American political tradition. Recently, how-
ever, scholars have paid more attention to the ideological component of 
political parties and challenged the consensus thesis. E e most prominent 
and comprehensive work in this area has demonstrated that American polit-
ical parties do have reasoned, observable, evolving, and oppositional ideolo-
gies. However, this scholarship has generally focused exclusively on “domestic 
policy ideologies.” As a result, the critical and interconnected role that inter-
national events—and particularly wars—have played in the development of 
party ideology has not been fully recognized. 
 In one sense, this omission is not surprising because, as David R. Mayhew 
and Ira Katznelson have recently noted, many scholars studying the United 
States limit their causal variables to those that can be found within the 
nation’s borders. 1 Regrettably, this narrow approach leaves out an enormous 
explanatory factor: foreign wars. E e underappreciation of major U.S. wars as 
a causal variable in the domestic realm limits our understanding of American 
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politics and government. For scholars of American political development 
and policy history, the domestic and international realms are too oL en 
treated as separate entities, existing independently of each other. Like brief 
thunderstorms, international events are cast as temporary distractions that 
can make the lights Z icker on Capitol Hill; but once the storms pass, normal 
business resumes unperturbed and in accordance with previously scheduled 
events. 
 What follows is, in part, an attempt to take up the scholarly call to arms 
by Mayhew, Katznelson, and others. I do so by exploring the relationship 
between international inZ uences and party ideology. Wars, oB ering the most 
profound kind of foreign inZ uence, are an obvious place to begin. I argue 
here that World War II oB ers a prime case study of this relationship and that 
it was a major contributing factor in the Democratic Party’s ideological shiL  
away from economic populism and toward inclusion and solidarity. 
 ideology, rhetoric, and american political parties 
 Political scientist Louis Hartz argued that, in stark contrast to Europe, a clas-
sical liberal consensus was J rmly planted in American culture, and that any 
party diB erences were minor and played out within the narrow conJ nes of 
that ideological box. 2 Historians such as Richard Hofstadter and Daniel 
Boorstin led the “consensus school,” which articulated a similar lack of ideo-
logical conZ ict. 3 Hofstadter touched on political parties in making his broader 
consensus argument: “It is in the nature of politics that conZ ict stands in the 
foreground,” he wrote. But the “J erceness of the political struggles has oL en 
been misleading; for the range of vision embraced by the primary contestants 
in the major parties has always been bounded by the horizons of property 
and enterprise.” 4 
 Only in the postreform era have scholars consistently focused on ideol-
ogy as a central component of political parties. While studies emphasized the 
absence of intraparty ideological cohesion and lack of interparty ideological 
conZ ict in much of the post–World War II era, more recent research shows 
that in the post–1968–72 period, the parties have become more ideologically 
cohesive internally and more polarized comparatively. 5 Congressional studies 
are paying more attention to ideology, many noting the increasing ideological 
cohesion of the caucuses. 6 E e elections and voting literature notes a revival 
in parties, partisanship, and ideological voting at the individual level. 7 Other 
studies explore ideology and parties in the states. 8 Scholars are also addressing 
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the role of intraparty factions, considering, among other things, their ideo-
logical inZ uences on the larger parties. 9 Several factors have been cited as 
drivers of party ideology, including economics and social class, ethnicity and 
culture, critical realignments, and elite-led responses to various domestic 
events. 10 John Gerring aptly summarizes this literature: “To put it baldly, the 
premise of nonideological parties no longer seems to J t the facts as we know 
them. Indeed, contemporary work by political scientists and historians points 
toward a new understanding of ideology’s involvement in American party 
politics.” 11 
 E e most comprehensive account of party ideologies comes from Ger-
ring. 12 Challenging the consensus school (that is, a lack of ideological distinc-
tion between parties), he argues that from 1828 onward the Republicans (or 
their Whig precursors prior to 1860) and the Democrats have oB ered co-
herent, identiJ able, and changing ideologies in opposition to each other. Ger-
ring’s thorough account concludes with a consideration of the factors that 
drive this partisan change. Ultimately, he J nds there “is no general factor” 
and that “lots of things” drive ideological shiL s. 13 Yet international inZ uences 
are notably absent from Gerring’s extensive list of “lots of things.” To his 
credit, he directly explains his exclusive focus on domestic factors, arguing 
that “because foreign policy has rarely played a signiJ cant role in American 
electoral politics, I focus primarily on domestic policies.” He continues in a 
footnote: 
 Foreign policy issues have entered debate at infrequent intervals 
(generally under conditions of open or imminent military conZ ict) 
aL er which politics has resumed its normal pace and usual domestic 
preoccupations. … Party views on foreign policy have not corre-
sponded neatly with the historical development of party views on 
domestic policy matters; which is to say, foreign policy ideologies 
have changed at diB erent times and (oL en) for diB erent reasons than 
domestic policy ideologies. E erefore, foreign policy provides a 
somewhat misleading guide to the public political identities of the 
American parties, and is best analyzed separately. 14 
 But it is far from clear that major foreign policy issues have been “rare” and 
“infrequent.” In its approximately 220 years as a country, the United States has 
fought “hot” wars for more than 40 of those years, was immersed in the Cold 
War for decades, and has been involved in numerous smaller international 
conZ icts. E is consideration suggests that exploring domestic and foreign 
policy ideologies in isolation is problematic. 
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 Argument and Methodological Approach 
 E e problem with excluding any consideration of foreign policy is that it omits 
a critical variable in understanding party ideologies. Major wars, in particular, 
have been an ongoing and signiJ cant inZ uence on domestic American poli-
tics. I argue here that events in the form of foreign wars can alter party ideol-
ogy because they reshape the political landscape, thereby compelling political 
parties to alter their governing philosophies. In other words, wars force the 
dimension of international relations into the ideological package. 
 E is thesis builds on Gerring’s typology by presenting a case study of 
ideological change in the Democratic Party following World War II. E e war 
helps to explain the Gerring-identiJ ed shiL  in Democratic ideology away 
from economic populism. While Gerring is certainly correct that no single 
factor can account for  all instances of ideological change, World War II was 
intimately tied to this particular shiL  in the Democrats’ public philosophy 
and such a link suggests that other wars could have had—and could continue 
to have—a similar inZ uence. 
 I adopt Gerring’s general approach to studying party ideology. He fo-
cuses on “presidential parties,” or those elements of a party that “select (or 
endorse) a party’s national platform and presidential nominee,” and examines 
only the parties’ “public ideology—the words and actions by which leaders 
represented their party before the general electorate” (to the exclusion of “pri-
vate communications, motivations, and interests”). 15 E at is, this approach 
highlights a party’s dominant ideological strain as seen in its national plat-
forms and the rhetoric of its presidents and presidential nominees. 
 One limitation of this approach is that by focusing only on the dominant 
ideological strain within a party, the role played by internal groups or factions 
is minimized. While some nuance and historical detail may be lost in this 
approach, it carries the beneJ t of highlighting the dominant and most impor-
tant ideological thread and is perfectly appropriate for the purpose of devel-
oping an historical synthesis of American party ideology. E is focus also has 
the advantage of speaking directly to Gerring’s scholarship. E e value added 
here is not in establishing a grand theory of party ideology in this historical 
context, but rather in building upon a leading interpretation and in identi-
fying a central source of party ideology overlooked in previous scholarship. 
 E e emphasis on elite rhetoric, despite some of its own limitations, also 
oB ers an eB ective way to gauge ideology. It is possible, of course, that parties, 
presidents, and candidates may alter their rhetoric in front of diB erent audiences. 
E ey may also conceal their “true” beliefs behind crowd-pleasing rhetoric. 
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And party platforms may be more indicative of carefully orchestrated, 
nonoB ending platitudes than realistic statements of where party elites (or 
rank-and-J le members) actually stand. 16 Yet rhetoric is also the conduit 
through which parties and political leaders communicate with the public 
and, frequently, other elites. As Mark A. Smith argues, rhetoric “is the cur-
rency of politics in that everything important passes through it. … It provides 
the connecting link between the goals of [political] leaders and their suc-
cesses, limited in some ways but profound in others, in reshaping electoral 
coalitions and changing public policy.” 17 As such, rhetoric is an invaluable 
source for understanding the development of party ideologies in America. 
E e rhetoric used here also oB ers the beneJ t of creating a level and compa-
rable playing J eld across time. E ere is no reason to think that party plat-
forms, campaign speeches, and State of the Union addresses from one year 
are any more or less representative than those of another year. Whatever the 
limitations of these data sources, they oB er consistency. Additionally, the 
platforms, candidate speeches, and State of the Union addresses employed 
here were all delivered to national audiences, thus limiting instances of atyp-
ical pandering before small, homogenous groups. Finally, this approach con-
forms to that taken by Gerring. To engage his work—the only substantial 
study of party ideology throughout American history—it is helpful to pro-
ceed, at least initially, on similar methodological grounds. 
 world war ii and democratic party ideology 
 Before World War II, Democratic ideology was rooted in class-based popu-
lism, but aL er the war, the party’s ideology was based on universality and soli-
darity. 18 World War II played a critical role in this change. Mobilizing for and 
J ghting the war required a uniJ ed country. E e class-based rhetoric Demo-
crats employed prior to the outbreak of hostilities was divisive, pitting diB erent 
segments of the country against one another. E e war—if only by necessity—
required a new approach that brought people together in solidarity for a 
national cause. E is need encouraged the party to adopt a more unifying, inclu-
sive ideology that became evident in the war’s aL ermath. Various other factors 
indirectly tied to the war also bolstered this ideological transformation. 
 Prewar Democrats 
 Until recently, there was a general consensus that 1932 marked a critical hinge 
point for the Democratic Party. Before Franklin Roosevelt’s election in that 
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pivotal year, the party was plagued by constant disputes between its disparate, 
and oL en fundamentally opposed, elements. E e party contained natural 
combatants: northerners and southerners; urban workers and rural farmers; 
nativists and immigrants; progressives and conservatives. In essence, the 
Democrats were a motley array of opposing forces unable to unify around a 
coherent ideology. 19 
 All this changed, the standard view maintains, in 1932. Roosevelt not 
only saved the nation from the throes of the Great Depression but also 
rescued his party from irrelevance. For the J rst time in decades, the party 
had an identiJ able ideology centered around the public philosophy of 
the welfare state. 20 Internal J ssures did not disappear, but the majority of 
Democrats were united in their support for redistributive social and 
economic policies, statism, and science. 21 As political scientist Sidney Milkis 
has argued, Roosevelt’s reinterpretation of America’s “liberal” ideals marked 
a profound break with the nation’s limited government tradition. Prior to the 
1930s, liberalism had always been linked to “JeB ersonian principles and the 
natural rights tradition of limited government drawn from Locke’s Second 
Treatise and the Declaration of Independence. Roosevelt pronounced a new 
liberalism in which constitutional government and the natural rights tradi-
tion were not abandoned but linked to programmatic expansion and an ac-
tivist national government.” 22 
 Political scientists James Morone and John Gerring, however, argue that 
the transition was not quite so seamless. Morone notes that while the admin-
istrative state was greatly expanded under FDR, this was merely a natural 
response to the Depression: “E e New Deal administrative inventions did not 
break sharply with the past. Roosevelt leL  behind a far greater government, 
but not one fundamentally diB erent from … that he found.” 23 Gerring builds 
on Morone’s analysis by demonstrating that the New Deal was the outgrowth 
of Bryanism and Wilsonianism and that the party’s ideology fundamentally 
changed not with Roosevelt and the New Deal, but following World War II. 
Gerring reframes the period by identifying the Democratic Party’s ideolog-
ical hinge point in the late 1940s. 24 Contrary to the traditional view, Gerring 
maintains that the party was uniJ ed from the Bryan era on. “E ere was more 
cohesion and continuity within Democratic ideology between 1896 and 1948 
than is generally recognized. E is ideology was not oriented on JeB erson, nor 
was it oriented on the technocratic management of the welfare state; rather it 
was  Populist in tone and policy.” 25 
 Prewar Democrats were tied together by a belief in market regulation 
and wealth redistribution based on the public-interest model of evangelical 
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Christianity. Democratic ideology was rooted “in the ideal of majority rule 
and in the populist narrative in which the people fought for their rights 
against an economic and political elite. … From 1896 to 1948, Democratic 
candidates sounded the bell of political and economic freedom and advo-
cated for the rights of the common man.” 26 Policy proposals, invoking the 
language of reform, were tailored to beneJ t and appeal to the “people.” Mo-
nopolies and big business were targeted because they purportedly operated in 
opposition to the people’s interests. 27 
 All this, of course, is not to suggest that the 1932 election and the New 
Deal were unimportant for the Democratic Party. Indeed, the standard view 
is certainly correct that key aspects of the party looked very diB erent aL er 
1932. As Milkis argues, the presidency and its relationship to the party system 
were profoundly aB ected, and New Deal policies created a federal govern-
ment that was a much more prominent and vital feature of Americans’ daily 
lives. 28 Yet the vast expansion of government during the 1930s was character-
ized by experimentation in direct response to the Great Depression—not a 
coherent, planned set of policy initiatives long envisioned by Roosevelt. Fed-
eral government intervention was initially conceived of as a temporary solu-
tion to a crisis and, even then, only aL er Roosevelt realized that traditional 
solutions such as balancing the budget would be insu  cient. 29 Governing 
around a welfare state did not fully emerge within the Democratic Party until 
the 1960s. In sum, as Gerring argues, pre–World War II Democrats were, 
from a purely ideological standpoint, rooted in a public philosophy of class-
based rhetorical appeals pitting the “people” against the “interests.” 
 Postwar Democrats 
 How, then, was Democratic ideology diB erent aL er World War II? Most simply, 
a new strain of universality and solidarity emerged that was not present in the 
party’s public philosophy before the war, and it proved to be an important and 
enduring feature of its popular appeals. 30 Equality came to be associated with 
inclusion and formed the basis for postwar Democratic ideology. Gerring writes: 
 [In] the wake of World War II, the party’s egalitarian agenda was 
broadened to include a host of social groups and political issues that 
did not J t neatly into the socioeconomic perspective and the masses-
versus-elites dichotomy of the Populist period. Equality in the 1890s 
or the 1930s did not mean the same thing as equality in the 1950s and 
1960s. Forsaking the shrill polemics of Bryan, the party now adopted 
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a soothing tone and reassuring demeanor. E e rhetoric of reconcili-
ation replaced that of resentment. E e all-inclusive American People 
subsumed the J gure of the Common Man. … E e organizing theme 
of Democratic ideology changed from an attack against special priv-
ilege to an appeal for inclusion. Party leaders rewrote the Demo-
cratic hymn-book; Populism was out, and Universalism was in. 31 
 Tolerance, understanding, and inclusion became key components of the 
Democratic platform, which stood in stark contrast to the divisive “people vs. 
the powerful” rhetoric that preceded it. 
 Two speciJ c changes in Democratic ideology—one rooted in economic 
policy, particularly with regard to labor issues, and one rooted in minority 
rights—are evident in the postwar epoch and diB erentiate the party’s prewar 
and postwar eras. During the J rst half of the century, Democrats embraced 
organized labor and the working man and rhetorically pitted them against 
business interests. But postwar Democrats worried less about capitalism’s ex-
cesses because John Maynard Keynes and John Kenneth Galbraith persuaded 
them that regulatory measures were su  cient to avoid serious economic de-
pressions. 32 Historian Alan Brinkley articulates the scope of the transforma-
tion. By the end of the war, he argues, “E e concept of New Deal liberalism 
had assumed a new form. … [Its adherents] largely ignored the New Deal’s 
abortive experiments in economic planning, its failed eB orts to create harmo-
nious associational arrangements, its vigorous … antimonopoly and regula-
tory crusades, its open skepticism toward capitalism and its captains, its overt 
celebration of the state.” 33 In sum, liberal Democrats came to fully embrace 
capitalism. E e lessons learned during the war, combined with previous New 
Deal policies, led to a dramatic soL ening of their prior economic views. 
 Also in the economic realm, the party became increasingly amenable to 
business in the 1950s, while organized labor became something of an electoral 
liability to the extent that candidates went to great lengths to demonstrate 
that they were not beholden to the American Federation of Labor or the Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations. As Gerring explains, Populist-era Demo-
crats employed “shrill cries against the depredations of ‘monopoly,’ ‘big 
business,’ and ‘usurious’ business practices. In the postwar era, the party 
dropped its litany of economic protest themes. … Democrats’ embrace of ‘the 
American capitalistic system’ was, for the J rst time in party history, unal-
loyed by JeB ersonian suspicions.” 34 E e party gradually reduced labor’s inZ u-
ence, culminating in an altered method of selecting presidential candidates. 
By 1972, the Democratic nominee was chosen through primary elections. As 
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such, union leaders were no longer able to position themselves as powerful 
forces in the “smoke-J lled rooms” where candidates were previously chosen. 35 
E us, the Democrats had moved from divisive pro-worker, anti-business 
rhetoric to a public stance of less support for organized labor coupled with 
less criticism of business interests. 
 E e Democrats’ ideological pivot can also clearly be seen in their shiL  
from focusing on majority rule to emphasizing pluralism and minority 
rights. 36 As many have pointed out, blacks especially became a consistent fea-
ture in the party’s rhetoric. 37 Of course, it should be noted that the staunchest 
supporters of segregation all hailed from the Democratic Party. Yet, among 
those elements of the party supporting racial liberalism (and this became the 
dominant strain by at least the 1940s), Gerring’s extensive content analysis 
yields interesting J ndings. Initially, Democrats, especially President Harry 
Truman, made an attempt to frame racial issues through the party’s prewar 
Populist lens by painting minorities, like laborers, as oppressed common 
people dominated by a cabal of powerful economic elites. But by 1948, as seen 
in that year’s convention platform, the party had adopted the new and now 
familiar frame of “civil rights” and “minority rights”: 
 E e Democratic Party commits itself to continuing its eB orts to 
eradicate all racial, religious and economic discrimination. We again 
state our belief that racial and religious minorities must have the 
right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, the full and equal 
protection of the laws, on a basis of equality with all citizens as guar-
anteed by the Constitution. … We call upon Congress to support 
our President in guaranteeing these basic and fundamental Ameri-
can principles: (1) the right of full and equal political participation; 
(2) the right to equal opportunity of employment; (3) the right of 
security of person; (4) and the right of equal treatment in the service 
and defense of our nation. 38 
 E is rhetorical shiL  was signiJ cant. It demonstrated that these issues were 
group-based, rather than a  ictions pertaining to the great mass of common 
people. A similar group-based emphasis permeated the Democratic approach 
to poverty. E e class-based rhetoric of Populist era Democrats was replaced 
by framing poverty as an abstract “social issue” with complex causes. As 
Gerring puts it, “E ere were still victims—the poor—but no longer any vic-
timizers” like trusts or big business. 39 
 Democrats no longer saw a nation polarized between two classes, a small 
economic elite and the masses. E e prewar notion of the common people 
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now appeared romantic and ill-informed. 40 Rather, there existed a vast 
middle into which numerous minority groups did not J t, and remedies were 
thus required to bring them into the fold. So, while prewar Populist Demo-
crats were focused on bringing down the small economic elite and liL ing the 
masses, postwar Democrats focused on helping relatively small, targeted 
minority groups and were suspicious of the masses who held them down. 
Ironically, mass society—once the intended beneJ ciary of Democratic 
eB orts—had come to replace the conniving economic elite as the party’s 
target. 
 Gerring provides numerous examples of this new focus throughout the 
party’s postwar epoch. 41 In addition, this change is clearly reZ ected in Demo-
cratic Party platforms. E ey frequently began to list a series of particular mi-
nority groups along with tangible actions the party or candidate pledged to 
take on their behalf. 42 E e party’s platforms from its prewar Populist era did 
not reZ ect the laundry-list approach that the Democrats adopted in the post-
war era. 
 E ese two broad factors—economic moderation and group-based mi-
nority rights—engendered a Democratic Party based around solidarity and 
inclusion. While the prewar Democrats focused on class divisions within 
society, the postwar party focused on national unity constructed around a 
series of disparate groups. Gerring concludes: “Consensus, tolerance, com-
promise, pragmatism, and mutual understanding … were the ideals to which 
the Democratic leaders aspired, ideals that were central to the party’s [postwar] 
weltanschauung, in which all peoples, all faiths, and all lifestyles were 
embraced (at least in principle).” 43 
 The Infl uence of World War II on the Democrats’ Ideological Shift 
 E e primary question leL  to be addressed is how the ideology of the Demo-
cratic Party was transformed from its prewar class-based populism into post-
war solidarity and inclusion. In other words, what accounts for Democrats 
altering their economic populism in favor of economic moderation and drop-
ping their “people versus the powerful” rhetoric in favor of a group-based, 
minority rights approach? World War II played a major role. Most promi-
nently, the war required national unity. Solidarity and cohesiveness were crit-
ical in facing what was arguably the nation’s gravest threat. Class-based 
divisions were secondary in this age of all-out war and had to be transcended 
if the country was to be victorious. E is need for national unity made the old-
style Democratic rhetoric seem out of place and retrograde. In addition, 
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World War II was tied up in other factors that Gerring emphasizes. Several 
revolved around economics: a long period of economic growth, the rise of the 
middle class, the ascendancy of Keynesianism, and the declining inZ uence of 
labor unions. E e Democratic Party’s ideological shiL  was also inZ uenced by 
the emergence of racial politics, the lack of a challenge from the LeL  (e.g., the 
Communist Party, Huey Long, or the Progressive Party), and the Cold War. 44 
In sum, multiple factors pushed the Democratic Party toward this major 
ideological shiL . But a critical point to be noted for present purposes is that 
the crisis of World War II contributed directly to the shiL  by compelling the 
party to focus on national unity. In principle, once the war ended, the Demo-
crats could have reverted back to their Populist-era ideological position. 
However, the complex and mutually reinforcing relationship between the war 
and the factors Gerring emphasizes helped solidify the change. 
 Wartime Solidarity:  World War II’s most important direct eB ect on the 
Democratic Party’s ideological shiL  arose from the necessity of unifying the 
country behind the war eB ort. E e divisive appeals pitting the “common 
people” against the “interests” or the economic elite quickly fell out of style aL er 
Japanese bombers attacked the United States. 
 E is rhetorical shiL  is reZ ected in the party’s 1936, 1940, and 1944 plat-
forms and in President Roosevelt’s major speeches. E ese three electoral 
years oB er a good base for a prewar-postwar comparison. Roosevelt ran as a 
sitting president in all three. E e J rst two occurred before the United States 
entered World War II, though by 1940 Roosevelt thought it was very possible 
that the country would ultimately become involved. E e 1944 contest, of 
course, occurred several years aL er the Pearl Harbor attack brought America 
into the war. 
 E e 1936 Democratic platform was J lled with the party’s then-commonplace 
class-warfare appeals. The document is full of pledges on behalf of “the 
people” and denunciations of the economic elite: 
 We hold this truth to be self-evident—that 12 years of Republican 
surrender to the dictatorship of a privileged few have been sup-
planted by a Democratic leadership which has returned the people 
themselves to the places of authority. … We shall continue to use 
the powers of government to end the activities of the malefactors 
of great wealth who defraud and exploit the people. … We have 
safeguarded the thriL  of our citizens by restraining those who would 
gamble with other peoples savings [ sic ]. … Monopolies and the 
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concentration of economic power … continue to be the master of 
the producer, the exploiter of the consumer, and the enemy of the 
independent operator. … E e issue in this election is plain. E e 
American people are called upon to choose between a Republican 
administration that has and would again regiment them in the ser-
vice of privileged groups and a Democratic administration dedi-
cated to the establishment of equal economic opportunity for all 
our people. 45 
 Similarly, as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. notes, President Roosevelt’s 1936 
campaign emphasized class-based appeals, focusing on “the economic gains 
his Administration had secured [and] appeals to class diB erences.” 46 Roosevelt 
emphasized these themes throughout his campaign, oL en alternating between 
the two touchstones from speech to speech. 47 An address in New York City on 
October 31, 1936, exempliJ ed the class-based theme: 
 We had to struggle with the old enemies of peace—business and 
J nancial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, 
sectionalism, war proJ teering. E ey had begun to consider the Gov-
ernment of the United States as a mere appendage to their own aB airs. 
We know now that Government by organized money is just as dan-
gerous as Government by organized mob. … E ey are unanimous in 
their hate for me—and I welcome their hatred. I should like to have it 
said of my J rst Administration that in it the forces of selJ shness and 
of lust for power met their match. I should like to have it said of my 
second Administration that in it these forces met their master. 48 
 Roosevelt went on to refer to the J nancial elites as “tyrants” who “attack the 
integrity and honor of American Government itself ” and “campaign against 
America’s working people.” 49 E e key point here is that in the 1936 presiden-
tial campaign, the Democratic Party was emphasizing class-based diB erences. 
On one side stood the hard working common people, and on the other the 
elites seeking to exploit the less well oB  and greedily line their own pockets 
with the fruits of the working person’s labor. 
 E e 1940 Democratic platform was similar in tone and style to that of 
1936. Again there was a lengthy discourse on how the administration had 
worked to protect average Americans from the selJ sh elites. A few illustrative 
lines convey the theme: 
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 We have attacked and will continue to attack unbridled concentra-
tion of economic power and the exploitation of the consumer and 
the investor. We have attacked the kind of banking which treated 
America as a colonial empire to exploit; the kind of securities busi-
ness which regarded the Stock Exchange as a private gambling club 
for wagering other people’s money; the kind of public utility holding 
companies which used consumers’ and investors’ money to suborn a 
free press, bludgeon legislatures and political conventions, and con-
trol elections against the interest of their customers and their secu-
rity holders. 50 
 In keeping with the party’s standard prewar rhetoric, references to “the 
people” and “the average man and woman” were juxtaposed against “the self-
ish interest of a few” or “a privileged few” bent on “exploitation” as a means to 
amass “vast political empires.” 51 
 Roosevelt’s acceptance speech to that national convention, by contrast, 
struck a very diB erent note and signaled a crucial shiL  in his rhetoric. E e 
President spent nearly the entire address discussing the war in Europe, noting 
that it “is not an ordinary war,” that it “threatens all men everywhere,” and 
“would of necessity deeply aB ect the future of this nation.” 52 Given this reality, 
Roosevelt said he would reluctantly serve a third term. He only brieZ y 
touched on domestic politics and the party’s standard class-warfare theme, 
and did so in a remarkably less bellicose manner than had been typical: 
 We have had to develop … the answers to aspirations which had 
come from every State and every family in the land. … Some of us 
have labeled it a wider and more equitable distribution of wealth in 
our land. It has included among its aims, to liberalize and broaden 
the control of vast industries—lodged today in the hands of a rela-
tively small group of individuals of very great J nancial power. But all 
these deJ nitions and labels are essentially the expression of one con-
sistent thought. E ey represent a constantly growing sense of human 
decency, human decency throughout our nation. E is sense of 
human decency is happily conJ ned to no group or class. … You J nd 
it, to a growing degree, even among those who are listed in that top 
group which has so much control over the industrial and J nancial 
structure of the nation. 53 
 Also notable in Roosevelt’s 1940 speech were his appeals for national unity. 
E e President said, for instance: “National unity in the United States became 
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a crying essential in the face of ” Europe’s turmoil. He went on to honor the 
sacriJ ce and national service of private citizens “who have placed patriotism 
about all else” by leaving their jobs and homes to protect the country in recent 
years. 54 In closing, Roosevelt referred to selJ shness but not with its usual as-
sociation with the rich. Rather, he used it to implore all Americans to join 
together in opposing the European forces J ghting against freedom: 
 It is the continuance of civilization as we know it versus the ultimate 
destruction of all that we have held dear—religion against godless-
ness; the ideal of justice against the practice of force; moral decency 
versus the J ring squad; courage to speak out, and to act, versus the 
false lullaby of appeasement. But it has been well said that a selJ sh 
and greedy people cannot be free. E e American people must decide 
whether these things are worth making sacriJ ces of money, of en-
ergy, and of self. 55 
 E us, while the 1940 Democratic platform echoed the party’s standard class-
based, populist themes, Roosevelt’s acceptance speech focused on the war in 
Europe, scarcely mentioned class divisions, reached out to the economic elite, 
and called for national unity. 
 Following the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 
national unity became central to Roosevelt’s strategy for winning the war. 
Any lingering attachment to divisive class-based rhetoric Roosevelt might 
have had was quickly discarded. As Roosevelt biographer Kenneth S. Davis 
has demonstrated, FDR’s chief worry was that the war “would be forced upon 
an America that remained deeply divided ideologically.” As a result, his job as 
president “had similarities to that of Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War—
the task of uniting the American people. … He must strive to make of himself 
the very personiJ cation of the kind of active American union that was vitally 
necessary, stressing the positive (all that made for union) while shunning, to 
the maximum possible degree, divisive words and deeds.” 56 In addition, the 
country was swept up in patriotism, which had a unifying force, rendering 
class distinctions, at least temporarily, less important. 57 
 Roosevelt’s new focus on solidarity was evident in his annual State of the 
Union addresses during World War II when he made more impassioned ap-
peals for national unity and sought to quell domestic divisions. His 1942 ad-
dress, for example, warned that “we must guard against divisions among 
ourselves.” 58 Similarly, appearing before Congress one year later, Roosevelt 
said: “Fortunately, there are only a few Americans who place appetite above 
patriotism. … We Americans intend to do this great job together. In our 
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common labors we must build and fortify the very foundation of national 
unity—conJ dence in one another.” 59 FDR’s 1944 State of the Union Address 
contained similar themes and omitted class-based denunciations—even 
when he detailed his new domestic economic plan, which he hoped would 
ultimately amount to a “second Bill of Rights.” 60 Before the war, such a pro-
posal would almost certainly have been accompanied by stark class-based 
rhetoric. 
 All of these speeches were devoid of anything even approaching an ap-
peal to class diB erences or denunciations of an economic or political elite. In 
short, as far as Roosevelt was concerned, Americans were in this J ght to-
gether. Winning World War II required a uniJ ed eB ort and there was no 
room for internal division. E is should not be a surprise. World War II was 
such a cataclysmic event that it completely reshu  ed the American political 
landscape. E e bitter class diB erences that characterized the prewar era 
appeared petty and unimportant when the country was faced with war against 
Nazism and fascism. 
 By 1944, the Democratic platform was in line with Roosevelt’s nomina-
tion speech four years earlier and his subsequent State of the Union addresses. 
E ere were appeals to unity and conscious eB orts to display solidarity. For 
instance, the platform stated: “Our gallant sons are dying on land, on sea, and 
in the air. E ey do not die as Republicans. E ey do not die as Democrats. 
E ey die as Americans.” 61 Notably, the prewar theme of helping “the people” 
remained, but the once constant references to a greedy oppositional elite were 
completely absent. E e harshest class-based line stated: “We reassert our faith 
in competitive private enterprise, free from control by monopolies, cartels, or 
any arbitrary private or public authority.” 62 
 Similarly, Roosevelt’s short 1944 acceptance speech lacked any reference 
to the class-based appeals seen before World War II. Rather, the President 
emphasized solidarity even in his brief discussion of domestic economics: 
“E e people of the United States have transcended party a  liation, not only 
Democrats but also forward-looking Republicans, and millions of indepen-
dent voters have turned to progressive leadership, a leadership which has 
sought consistently and with fair success to advance the average American 
citizen who had been so forgotten during the period aL er the last war.” 63 
Remarkably, that sentence about the domestic economy was the closest Roosevelt 
came to anything that could be construed as a class-based appeal. 
 E us , Democratic platforms and President Roosevelt’s key speeches from 
1936 to 1944 demonstrate a profound transition in the party’s rhetoric. E e 
class-based references that marked the prewar Democratic Party had been 
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abandoned. Of course, appeals were still made to average and working Amer-
icans but, crucially, the harsh denunciations of the “interests” and the “pow-
erful” were dropped entirely. In their place were statements emphasizing 
solidarity and national unity. Gerring suggests that the prewar “people versus 
the powerful” rhetoric characterized the Democratic Party until at least 1948. 
But interestingly, the only Roosevelt speech Gerring cites aL er the United 
States entered the war does not support this assertion. In response to Repub-
lican accusations of communist sympathizers within his administration, 
Roosevelt said: “E is form of fear propaganda is not new among rabble 
rousers and fomenters of class hatred.” 64 Gerring’s reliance on this quote to 
bridge the gap between 1941 and 1948 is curious because it is starkly diB erent 
from the kind of class-based appeals that prewar Democrats made. Rather 
than speaking to the majority of average Americans by attacking a selJ sh and 
powerful elite, Roosevelt here seems to have been accusing Republicans of 
engaging in divisive class warfare. 
 In sum, World War II marked the crucial hinge point in Democratic ide-
ology with regard to class antagonisms. E e war changed the domestic polit-
ical landscape and the Democrats responded, altering their rhetoric in crucial 
ways. Appeals to class tensions were out. National unity and solidarity were 
in. In the aL ermath of Pearl Harbor and the subsequent years of military 
conZ ict, class warfare simply did not resonate. In a similar vein, others have 
noted that overt eB orts were undertaken to increase unity across ethnic lines 
and reduce divisive nativism. 65 Nationalism and patriotism were the order of 
the day. Although class distinctions remained during these years, the country 
“rallied around the Z ag.” 66 Class-based appeals have never fully melted away 
from the Democrats’ public philosophy (such as Truman in 1948, Gore in 
2000, or Edwards in 2008), but they have not returned to claim the central, 
dominant role they played in the party’s prewar ideology. 
 Economic Factors:  Overlooking World War II, Gerring identiJ es several economic 
factors (in addition to other influences discussed in the next section) in 
explaining the Democratic Party’s ideological shiL . SpeciJ cally, he asserts that 
economic growth, the rise of the middle class, the triumph of Keynesianism, 
and the sagging inZ uence of labor unions induced the transformation. E ese 
factors were undeniably important in the Democrats’ shift, but it is worth 
noting that the war itself was a contributing and reinforcing factor in these very 
economic changes. E e war served, along with the economic considerations 
Gerring emphasizes, to ensure that the party’s ideological shiL  endured when, 
in principle, it might have reverted to its earlier Populist style. 
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 E e prewar Democratic focus on a “people vs. the powerful” rhetorical 
style is much more likely to be successful in an era of vast economic inequality 
or a period of economic hardship. Before the war, such appeals had obvious 
constituencies: J rst, poor laborers who worked hard under di  cult condi-
tions and then, aL er 1929, victims of the country’s worst-ever economic 
depression. AL er the war, the burgeoning and dominant middle class of the 
late 1940s—fueled by the G.I. Bill—combined with the period’s humming 
economy, gave class-based rhetoric less salience. 67 To have broad-based 
appeal, such rhetoric would have required the endorsement of the freshly 
constituted middle class, yet this demographic had new concerns of its own. 
As a result, the J erce class-based speech of the prewar Democrats fell on deaf 
ears. E e natural audience for this message had dissipated. 
 E ese developments were reinforced by the Democrats’ adoption of 
Keynesianism, the economic theory of maintaining a market-based economy 
augmented by governmental policies to promote consumption, increase em-
ployment, and stimulate business. While this embrace signaled the collapse 
of the hotly contested doctrine of pure laissez-faire economics, it also put the 
party in a position of defending the market economy. As David Kennedy 
writes, “If earlier liberals conceived of the economy as a mechanism that 
needed J xing, the Keynesians thought of the economy as an organism that 
needed feeding but that otherwise should be leL  to its own devices.” 68 E e 
adoption of Keynesianism, then, shiL ed the Democratic Party’s view of eco-
nomics in general and of the government’s role in the economy in particular. 
Obviously, the full adoption of Keynes’ theories was related to the strong 
economic growth and the growing middle class that it helped produce. It was 
also tied to the beginning of the end for organized labor. 69 
 Labor unions continued a long, slow decline in inZ uence in the postwar 
era. Organized labor had suB ered during World War II because of, among 
other factors, limits on strikes and internal divisions within the labor move-
ment. E en, following the war, passage of the TaL -Hartley Act in 1947, along 
with the growing economy and emergence of a strong middle class (which 
made the bill viable), all contributed to labor’s dwindling power. Historian 
Nelson Lichtenstein places the turning point between 1946 and 1948, when 
the union movement’s attempts to shape the postwar economy were stopped 
by business interests that by then had become at ease with Democrats. 
“Labor’s ambitions were thereaL er sharply curbed, and its economic program 
was reduced to a sort of militant interest group politics, in which a Keynesian 
emphasis on sustained growth and productivity gain-sharing replaced labor’s 
earlier commitment to economic planning and social solidarity.” 70 E e salient 
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point that emerges is that the above-referenced economic factors were all in-
timately tied together. E e growing economy and resulting middle class mod-
erated Democrats’ suspicion of capitalism and led them to buy into America’s 
market economy—albeit with their New Deal modiJ cations. In addition, the 
economy’s vitality proved the feasibility of, and validated the Democrats’ 
adoption of, Keynesianism. And the Democrats’ newly adopted Keynesian 
policies limited their commonalities with organized labor. E ese develop-
ments in turn led to labor’s initial slip. 
 E ese related economic factors clearly played a role in the Democratic 
Party’s new ideological makeup. Notably, though, World War II contributed 
to and reinforced these economic developments. Most economists and histo-
rians maintain that the war played an important role in ending the Great 
Depression and creating the ensuing strong economy. 71 E ey argue that the 
Keynesian-inspired massive federal spending galvanized the economy with 
multiplied eB ects on the civilian sector. As a result, the nation reached full 
employment and increased GNP and personal consumption, and out of all 
this a strong middle class emerged. Economist Herbert Stein is representative 
of this camp. He notes that before the war, the nation was perpetually mired 
in stagnation and permanent deJ cits with no easy solutions. In addition, 
there were still ten million people unemployed and there was no prospect 
that private investment could signiJ cantly mitigate the problem. But “the war 
changed all of that dramatically.” Full employment became a reality; the issue 
of secular stagnation was put to rest; businessmen became involved in federal 
economic policy; the federal debt, enormous budgets, and the pay-as-you-go 
tax system were erased; and opposing economic factions were able to unite 
behind the war eB ort. “All of this,” Stein writes, “came about primarily as a 
result of conditions created coincidentally and accidentally by the war.” 72 
 A smaller group of scholars contend that World War II’s inZ uence on the 
economic recovery was less profound than is generally thought. None con-
tend that it played no role, only that it was not the sole cause. Kennedy, for 
instance, says the war worked in tandem with the New Deal. “E e New Deal 
petered out in 1938. … [Full economic] recovery awaited not the release of 
more New Deal energies but the unleashing of the dogs of war. … When the 
war brought … a recovery that inaugurated the most prosperous quarter cen-
tury America has ever known, it brought it to an economy and a country that 
the New Deal had fundamentally altered.” 73 Economists J. Bradford de Long 
and Lawrence H. Summers oB er a stronger prewar argument. Utilizing pre- 
and postwar output data, they maintain that 80 percent of the economic 
recovery had already taken place by 1942. To the extent this is true, “It is hard 
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to attribute any of the pre-1942 catch-up of the economy to the war”— though, 
as De Long and Summers acknowledge, one could argue that Roosevelt began 
wartime mobilization well before the Pearl Harbor attack formally drew the 
United States into the war. 74 Still another view is oB ered by economist Robert 
Higgs, who argues that the major shiL  occurred not prior to (or as a result of) 
World War II, but in its immediate aL ermath. While the war did push the 
economy out of the Depression, it did so indirectly. “Certain events of the war 
years—the buildup of J nancial wealth and especially the transformation of 
expectations—justify an interpretation that views the war as an event that re-
created the possibility of genuine economic recovery. As the war ended, real 
prosperity returned.” 75 E us, Higgs argues that the war ended the Great De-
pression but in a roundabout way. Rather than the war bringing the economic 
downturn to an end as most scholars contend, the conZ ict induced a postwar 
boom from 1946 to 1949. 76 Clearly, then, there is disagreement over the role 
World War II played in ending the Great Depression and initiating a strong 
economy. E e timing of these eB ects is also contested. But the important 
point to note here is that the war and the economy were, in one way or an-
other, related and mutually reinforcing with regard to the inZ uence they had 
on the Democratic Party’s ideology. 
 E e war was also entangled with the Keynesian triumph and its embrace 
by Democrats. Economist Tyler Cowen writes: “E e onset of the war brought 
signiJ cant increases in demand and government spending, and eventually, 
government control over investment—precisely what Keynes had recom-
mended.” 77 As a consequence, instead of merely pointing out the inequalities 
and downfalls associated with a pure market economy, Democrats were now 
in a position of supporting the economic system. As Brinkley puts it, “Keynes’s 
economic doctrines … suggested ways to introduce in peacetime the kinds of 
stimuli that had created the impressive wartime expansion. E ey oB ered, in 
fact, an escape from one of liberalism’s most troubling dilemmas and a mech-
anism for which reformers had long been groping. E ey provided a way to 
manage the economy without directly challenging the prerogatives of capital-
ists.” 78 E at is, the war experience demonstrated that governmental interven-
tion in the private sector was extremely complicated and at some point became 
unnecessary. In addition, it showed that vast new regulatory functions were 
not required either. Rather, indirect economic oversight through monetary 
and J scal “levers” combined with a moderate welfare state was su  cient. 
E ese initiatives were no longer viewed as temporary solutions to stem the 
Z ow until a more fundamental solution was settled upon. Instead, these 
measures had become the solution. E e renewed wartime faith in economic 
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growth, Brinkley continues, led to “several ideological conclusions of consid-
erable importance to the future of liberalism. It helped relegitimize American 
capitalism [among those] who had developed serious doubts about its via-
bility. … It robbed the “regulatory” reform ideas … of their urgency and gave 
credence instead to Keynesian ideas.” 79 
 In sum, while the economic changes that Gerring identiJ ed clearly 
played key causal roles in the Democratic Party’s ideological shiL  at the end 
of the 1940s, World War II just as clearly contributed to and reinforced those 
developments. 80 
 Other Factors:  Gerring argues that at least three other factors—the emergence 
of racial politics, the lack of a leL ist challenger, and Cold War anticommunism—
also played a role in the Democratic Party’s postwar ideological shiL . 81 Yet, like 
the economic considerations, these factors were also intertwined with the war 
in important ways. 
 Race played a signiJ cant role in altering the Democrats’ ideological po-
sition. Traditionally, the party had been rooted in white supremacy, making 
this transformation all the more notable. Civil rights did not J t comfortably 
into the Democrats’ old majoritarian ideology. Rather, it was a new issue re-
quiring the extension of new rights to a targeted minority group. E e party’s 
adoption of the issue spurred it to identify other groups in need of rights 
extensions. 82 
 While the new attention to civil rights on the national agenda and in the 
Democratic Party’s ideology clearly had multiple propellants, African Amer-
ican involvement in the war reinforced its emergence. E e black community’s 
contribution to the war eB ort began to alter white attitudes on race. 83 In addi-
tion, the war galvanized the black community to organize itself by developing 
some of the key groups that would lead the civil rights movement in coming 
decades. 84 And J nally, the war spurred a new moral and intellectual environ-
ment that was more sympathetic to race issues. SpeciJ cally, the intellectual 
war against the Nazi regime undermined any ideology of racial supremacy in 
the United States by exposing unavoidable contradictions and hypocrisy at 
home. For example, several months before the United States even entered the 
war, President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met 
in Newfoundland to issue the Atlantic Charter, a brief statement laying out 
the eight “common principles in the national policies” of the United States 
and Great Britain “on which they base[d] their hopes for a better future for 
the world.” One of these principles was respect for “the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under which they will live; and [the United 
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States and Britain] wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to 
those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” 85 E e  New Republic summed 
up the di  culty, arguing that racial discrimination at home made a “mockery 
of the theory that we are J ghting for democracy, and we are giving aid and 
comfort to the enemy thereby.” 86 E e editors also worried that whites engaged 
in stoking racial tension in cities such as Detroit “were assuredly doing Hit-
ler’s work. We don’t doubt that the story of that riot was told all over Asia, 
with Nazi trimmings.” 87 Similarly, in 1943,  " e Nation argued: “It is time for us 
to clear our minds and hearts of the contradictions that are rotting our moral 
position and undermining our purpose. We cannot J ght fascism abroad 
while turning a blind eye to fascism at home. We cannot inscribe on our ban-
ners: ‘For democracy and a caste system.’ We cannot liberate oppressed peo-
ples while maintaining the right to oppress our own minorities.” 88 Liberal 
intellectuals, Brinkley notes, started moving “from a preoccupation with 
‘reform’ (with a set of essentially class-based issues centering around con-
fronting the problem of monopoly and economic disorder) and toward a pre-
occupation with ‘rights’ (a commitment to the liberation of oppressed peoples 
and groups).” 89 
 As a result of the war-induced factors described above—altered white 
attitudes, African American organization, and the changed intellectual cli-
mate—tangible policy beneJ ts were achieved. Several labor policies related to 
African Americans were initiated as a result of World War II. E e number of 
blacks working in defense industries skyrocketed during the war and much of 
this employment came in higher-paying, skilled jobs. While this transition 
resulted primarily from wartime labor shortages, it was due in part to several 
federal government initiatives designed to increase African American em-
ployment. E e War Labor Board, for instance, barred wage diB erences based 
on race in 1943. 90 In addition, labor unions restricting black membership 
were no longer oB ered the necessary certiJ cations by the National Labor 
Relations Board. Finally, the U.S. Employment Service banned job listings by 
race. 91 Combined, these policies amounted to what economist William J. Collins 
calls “the federal government’s J rst eB ort to enforce a wide-ranging anti-
discrimination policy.” 92 
 While these employment advances were signiJ cant, the most profound 
World War II–era policy changes for African Americans occurred in the 
realm of voting rights. E e Soldier Voting Act of 1942 federalized the right of 
soldiers to register and to vote absentee. 93 Even more important, though, the 
Soldier Voting Act abolished the poll tax. Eliminating the tax, which was 
designed to, and had the eB ect of, decreasing black access to the ballot in 
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southern states, was obviously crucial to providing full political participation 
to all citizens. Liberals in Congress had been attempting to do away with the 
poll tax for several years but had made little headway because bills were 
blocked in the Democratic-controlled House Judiciary Committee. But with 
the war under way, eliminating the poll tax for soldiers was di  cult to oppose 
and proponents of the measure emphasized its new relevance. As Florida 
Senator Claude Pepper said, eliminating the poll tax for soldiers “would ring 
around the world that America was carrying out its professions of democ-
racy.” 94 Historian Steven Lawson maintains that it was this new war-related 
argument that carried the day. Opponents had no cover to “J libuster [the bill] 
because they found it di  cult to justify the deprivation of the right to vote 
to men J ghting for their country.” 95 While states would still retain adminis-
trative control over absentee voting, the Soldier Voting Act was a turning 
point in the campaign for African American voting rights. As Alexander 
Keyssar argues, the “federal government’s disapproval of poll taxes had 
become a matter of law, and the wartime climate of opinion contributed to 
the repeal of the poll tax in Georgia in 1945 as well as to the postwar passage 
of state laws exempting veterans from poll taxes.” 96 Tellingly, the Soldier 
Voting Act marked the J rst expansion of African American voting rights 
since Reconstruction. 
 Smith v. Allwright , a 1944 U.S. Supreme Court case, carried even more 
signiJ cance for black voting rights. 97 In an 8–1 decision, the Court reversed 
1935’s  Grovey v. Townsend , which had held that political parties were private 
associations and thus not subject to the FiL eenth Amendment’s protections 
against racial discrimination. 98  Smith , by contrast, declared the so-called white 
primary unconstitutional. As Keyssar notes, “E e justices were not immune to 
events transpiring in the world around them. … E ey were well aware of the 
links between the ideological dimensions of World War II and the exclusion 
of blacks from voting in the South.” 99 Historian Darlene Clark Hine argues 
that the “white primary was one of the J rst casualties of World War II.” 100 
Contemporaneous accounts also made the connection. E e  New York Times 
Washington bureau chief Arthur Krock pinned the decision directly on the 
altered intellectual environment emanating from the war. “E e real reason for 
the overturn,” Krock wrote, was that “the common sacriJ ces of wartime have 
turned public opinion and the court against previously sustained devices to 
exclude minorities from any privilege of citizenship the majority enjoys.” 101 
 Smith ’s results were dramatic. By 1952, more than a million southern blacks were 
registered to vote—four times as many as in 1940. 102 In sum, World War II played 
an important and reinforcing role in elevating the prominence of racial politics. 
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 Along the same lines, the lack of a signiJ cant challenge from the leL  was 
at least partially a consequence of the economic factors addressed above. 
Before the war, there was no shortage of leL -wing challengers, including the 
Union Party, Huey Long, the American Labor Party, and the Communist 
Party. E e strong postwar economy and developing middle class limited the 
constituency to which such leL ists could easily appeal. 
 Another factor in the Democrats’ ideological shiL  was Cold War anti-
communism. It, too, was partially linked to the war. As Kennedy asserts, 
“World War II led directly to the Cold War and ended a century and a half 
of American isolationism.” 103 Indeed, World War II initiated an ongoing era 
of involvement in international relations. Much of the U.S. desire to stay 
engaged in world aB airs emanated out of the war. Because the war aB ected 
the United States so profoundly and in so many ways, the country sought to 
do everything in its power to minimize the chances of a similar future war. 
It laid plans for a world deliberative body similar to Wilson’s rejected 
League of Nations. In addition, the United States sought not only to rebuild 
benign versions of Germany and Japan, but also to export the ideology of 
democracy and capitalism. In short, World War II changed America’s posi-
tion in, and view of, the world. A widespread consensus developed that 
authoritarianism had to be confronted lest a Hitler-like J gure be allowed 
to emerge again. 104 
 World War II also changed the Soviet Union. For starters, the war was 
felt much more deeply in the USSR than in the United States. The Soviet 
Union was left in ruins with roughly 27 million fatalities—90 times the 
number of American dead. Joseph Stalin emerged from the war, like his 
U.S. counterparts, determined to avoid another conflict on that scale. He 
also felt the USSR was entitled to compensation for its wartime losses but, 
due to its devastation, the country was in no position to unilaterally take 
what it wanted. There was, however, a silver lining from Stalin’s perspec-
tive. Steeped in Marxist-Leninist ideology, he believed capitalism was 
bound to destroy itself. Stalin thought that once the war ended, Britain 
and the United States would have no further reason to cooperate and cap-
italism’s inherent flaws would emerge and plunge its practitioners into 
another depression. At that point, Stalin theorized, the Soviets could take 
over Europe as Hitler had amid squabbling capitalists in the aftermath of 
World War I. 105 
 E us, the postwar world sported the newly, but fully, engaged United 
States, on the one hand, as the planet’s leading champion of freedom, and, on 
the other, a devastated, but entitled, Soviet Union as the most authoritarian 
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nation on Earth biding its time for its rightful ascension over all of Europe. In 
this sense, World War II was very much at the root of the Cold War world that 
developed in its aL ermath. It is di  cult to know if this ideological confronta-
tion would have eventually emerged without World War II because those 
years shaped both countries in ways that made the Cold War so much more 
likely, if not unavoidable. Admittedly, this tie is indirect. And, admittedly, the 
Cold War itself inZ uenced Democratic ideology. Nonetheless, World War II 
played a role in setting the stage for this superpower confrontation. 
 E is new international climate—which reinforced domestic anticommu-
nism in the United States—had reverberations on the Democrats’ ideological 
repositioning. Gerring succinctly writes: “It is di  cult to overestimate the 
eB ects of the Cold War, which helped marginalize the leL  and legitimate the 
right; which seemed to vindicate the (Republican) perspective that statism, 
not individualism, was the primary enemy of the American public; and which 
granted foreign policy an ascendance over domestic policy that it had rarely 
enjoyed.” 106 E is consideration—along with the economic factors—may also 
help explain why Republicans enjoyed relative ideological stability in this pe-
riod of Democratic Z ux. 
 It was this powerful anticommunist sentiment in the wake of World War 
II that created such a di  cult environment for labor (and leL ists in general) 
and provided yet another reason for its marginalization. Anticommunist rhe-
toric became an animating point for Democrats following the war. Prevent-
ing communism from taking hold on the home front was of particular 
concern. 107 Typical of this new mind-set was Democratic presidential nom-
inee Adlai Stevenson’s 1952 acceptance speech: 
 I suggest that we would err, certainly, if we regarded communism as 
merely an external threat. Communism is a great international con-
spiracy and the United States has been for years a major target. … 
Communist agents have sought to steal our scientiJ c and military 
secrets, to mislead and corrupt our young men and women, to inJ l-
trate positions of power in our schools and colleges, in business J rms 
and in labor unions and in the Government itself. At every turn they 
have sought to serve the purposes of the Soviet Union. … Along
the way they have gained the help, witting or unwitting, of many 
Americans. … I fear there are still people in our country under illu-
sions about the nature of this conspiracy abroad and at home. … 
Communism is committed to the destruction of every value which 
the genuine American liberal holds most dear. So I would say to any 
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Americans who cling to illusions about communism and its fake uto-
pia: Wake up to the fact that you are in an alliance with the devil. 108 
 E e key point here is that communism and socialism had become public 
enemy number one for the Democrats. And organized labor—perhaps un-
fairly, but nonetheless—paid a price. In stark contrast to its prewar stance, the 
private sector became a point of pride for Democrats and they distanced 
themselves from labor. As Stevenson said later in his campaign: “We are for 
private, and proJ table, business. E e Democratic Party is against socialism in 
our life in any form—creeping, crawling or even the imaginary kind which 
shows up so oL en in the Republican oratory. I am opposed to socialized med-
icine, socialized farming, socialized banking, or socialized industry.” 109 While 
he did not single out labor, the implication was unavoidable: the Democratic 
Party was not going to support much of the action that labor sought. E is 
development was a striking departure from the party’s prewar position. E us, 
this new anticommunist focus played a role in labor’s demise along with 
Keynesianism, the strong economy, and the burgeoning middle class. 
 In sum, the Democrats’ ideology changed dramatically aL er World War 
II. It focused less on the populism associated with the J rst half of the century 
and took on an ideology based on solidarity and universality. E ese postwar 
Democrats were more economically conservative. In addition, they focused 
on minority rights as a means of inclusion and dispatched with their prior 
rhetoric trumpeting class warfare. And World War II had a profound inZ u-
ence on this ideological shiL . It directly created an environment requiring 
national unity that discredited divisive class-based appeals. E e war also 
inZ uenced and reinforced other factors explaining the Democrats’ ideolog-
ical shiL , including economic growth, a developing middle class, Keynesian-
ism, the decline of organized labor, the emergence of racial politics, the 
absence of a leL ist challenge, and the Cold War. 
 conclusion 
 E e ideological component of American political parties has received 
increased attention in recent decades. Scholars have posited various sources 
of party ideology, including class-based economics, ethnicity and culture, 
critical elections, and various elite-driven initiatives. LeL  out of these ac-
counts is a role for international events. 
 Major wars shape and change party ideologies by recasting the political 
landscape and, as a result, forcing political parties to alter their governing 
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philosophies. In other words, wars drive the element of international relations into 
political parties’ public philosophies. E e focus here has not been on promoting 
an overarching theory to explain party ideology, but in isolating and explaining a 
key source of party ideology that has not received adequate attention. 
 E e importance of foreign policy in party ideology can be seen through 
an examination of the World War II–era Democrats. A signiJ cant shiL  oc-
curred in the late 1940s. As John Gerring describes, prewar Democrats were 
rooted in class-based populist rhetoric pitting “the people” against powerful 
and entrenched elites. Following World War II, the party’s ideology has been 
characterized by inclusion. E e war was a key contributing factor in this major 
shiL . Most important, the war eB ort required national solidarity, which 
undermined and negated the oL en J erce and divisive prewar Democratic rhe-
toric. Accordingly, the party adopted a more unifying and inclusive public 
philosophy as is evident in the party’s platforms and President Roosevelt’s 
speeches. World War II also contributed to and reinforced the economic pros-
perity that made the Democrats’ “people vs. the powerful” rhetoric less salient 
with the newly expanded middle class. E e humming economy was also 
linked to the ruling Democrats and, thus, led them to embrace the success of 
their Keynesian-style capitalism even more fully and in a way they previously 
had not. E e war also was intertwined with, and played a reinforcing role in, 
several other factors that simultaneously pushed Democrats toward this ideo-
logical shiL , including the emergence of racial politics, the lack of a challenge 
from the LeL , and the new era of Cold War anticommunism. 
 Because wars are such major events with the frequently realized capacity 
to fundamentally shiL  the country’s political landscape, it is natural for polit-
ical parties to adjust their ideologies to the new terrain. Other scholars have 
touched on this point. Martin SheL er has argued that by presenting threats 
and opportunities to various groups in the American population, interna-
tional conZ icts have generated the cleavages that have shaped party structure 
and competition. 110 Such a framework for understanding party politics has 
clear ideological implications. More directly, John W. Compton has argued 
that Republican ideology shiL ed due to the Spanish-American War. E e 
GOP’s thirty-year focus on the strategic and commercial beneJ ts of foreign 
engagement, he maintains, was dispatched in favor of a new mission to aid 
foreigners. 111 Other instances of war-induced shiL s in party ideology could 
be explored in future research. For instance, the Vietnam War’s inZ uence on 
the rise of the “New Politics” Democrats could be examined as a possible 
source of lasting signiJ cance in the party’s ideology—especially with regard 
to Democratic positioning on foreign aB airs and identity politics. 
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 E e case presented here was highlighted because it was a particularly 
important and enduring shiL , and because it so clearly displays the way in 
which wars can alter a party’s ideology. More research that encompasses both 
foreign and domestic policy is needed in order to gain a complete picture of 
party ideology. Such work should ideally be comprehensive and address party 
ideology on both of these fronts—as parties themselves are forced to do—
rather than isolate a domestic ideology and a foreign aB airs ideology. In the 
real world of politics, these arenas inZ uence one another and cannot be 
divorced. Scholarly attempts to do so will yield only a partial and distorted 
picture of parties and their ideological makeup. 
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